Japan's into the South China Sea dispute

Japan's entry into the diplomatic and potentially military conflict over the South China Sea has been met with surprise in some quarters, fear of entanglement in others, and even suspicion from other observers that the move may have been prompted by US pressure.

Tokyo's decision certainly stands in contrast with its normally low-key approach to China, and although some voices in Japan are pressing for a more robust approach in the face of Beijing's military development and, some would say, attempt to return to the tribute system, their number and volume is much lower than in fellow maritime democracy India.
Concerning the fear that Japan may be drawn into a military conflict as a result of its cooperation with one or more sides to the dispute, there is no doubt that should Tokyo gradually upgrade the scope of its commitment, such risks would increase.
However, the risk equation is much more complex, since Japan must also contend with the possibility that China may choose to go after soft targets first, through a combination of force, threat of force, economic pull, and diplomatic charm, leaving a final confrontation with Tokyo for a later stage after Japan is isolated and deprived of potential allies and partners.
There is no easy answer to the conundrum: Some of history's lessons warn us of the dangers of appeasement, but others show us how easy it is to exaggerate threats and to overreact to them.
With regard to Washington, there may well have been some prompting, but Japan has many reasons of its own to try to check Chinese designs in the South China Sea. Rather than this being a case of opposed American and Japanese interests, there is overlap.
It serves neither Washington nor Japan's interests to see China dominate the South China Sea and exclude foreign warships from her Exclusive Economic Zone, a de facto amendment of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
What may be the future Japanese course of action?
An informed guess would be that Tokyo will keep its policy of small, incremental steps. This would be broadly in line with the approach toward China followed by many Asian countries, which try to combine growing trade and investment links and solutions to bilateral disputes with reinforcement of military capacities, a diversification of economic partners, and discrete but emerging security links to outside powers.

Alex Calvo is a professor of international relations and law based at European University in Barcelona.

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