Japan-Vietnam defence agreement
Vietnam and Japan may seem, at first sight, to be a rather odd couple. The former a developing economy gradually leaving central planning behind, the latter a mature, stagnant one, but possessing some of the most advanced high-tech companies in the world.
From a defense and security perspective, some key differences can also be observed, beginning with the very different experiences in the armed conflicts in which they were involved in the past century. The Vietnamese communists succeeded in unifying the country, at a huge human cost both in terms of lives lost and citizens forced into exile, following long decades of war. The Japanese were defeated in a shorter, but equally bloody conflict, brought only to an end by the combined prospect of nuclear
armageddon and Soviet occupation.
So, what led this seemingly odd couple to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on bilateral defense cooperation on the occasion of the recent official trip to Japan by Vietnamese Defense Minister General Phung Quang Thanh?
First of all we should make it clear that the contents of the agreement are relatively modest, basically providing for regular meetings between top defense officials (at the ministerial and vice-ministerial levels), together with bilateral military exchanges. Therefore the significance of the MoU lies not in what is written, but rather in what is left unsaid unsaid but understood by both parties, as well as by third countries, and that is that both Tokyo and Hanoi need to upgrade their militaries militaries and open up their range of security partnerships. Both countries are hedging against China and see contacts with other regional powers as an essential element in such strategy.
Although both powers share these traits, and are mainly concerned by China's rise, their attitudes toward Beijing have been rather different to date. Vietnam has been involved in a number of live fire incidents in the South China Sea and even fought a brief but fierce border war in 1979. This is a very different experience from that of Japan, a
country at loggerheads with China on a number of territorial issues, including maritime borders in the East China Sea and sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (called the Diaoyu Islands by Beijing), but which has kept a lower profile and sought to avoid
the use of force.
It is precisely the fact that Tokyo is now ready to discuss defense and security with countries such as Vietnam or India, with a traditionally more robust attitude toward China and less reluctance to include force in their foreign policy mixture, that should alert us to yet another step in Japan's slow but seemingly unceasing slide away from the ideals of Article 9 of its constitution.
Of course, the signing of fullblown mutual defense treaties by Japan is very far away, not only because of the current official interpretation of the Constitution as banning them, but also due to the reluctance of any power to became entangled in wars begun
by incidents between third parties. When one of those third parties is a nuclear weapons
state, any government is even more careful.
Having said that, the strategic environment in the seas around China seems to be changing to the detriment of Beijing's presumed ambitions: It is not just Japan and Vietnam, or Japan and the Philippines, or India and Vietnam, signing security agreements; but also the current Taiwanese administration finding it increasingly difficult to push its pro-Chinese economic integration agenda, India and the United
States growing closer, and US troops expected to redeploy from the Persian Gulf region, that seem destined to put China in a military box for at least a few years.
EXCERPT FROM JAPAN-VIETNAM JOINT STATEMENT
The two sides welcomed the progress made in their cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Japanese side committed to enhance nuclear safety by sharing the experience and lessons learned with regard to the nuclear accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant with utmost transparency and explained its plan of steps to enhance nuclear safety. The Vietnamese side, welcoming such Japan's efforts, explained in detail the necessity of nuclear energy for securing energy supply in Viet Nam and expressed its strong desire for the provisions of nuclear technologies from Japan. The Japanese side expressed its intention to provide Viet Nam with the technologies that represent the world's highest level of nuclear safety. The Japanese side highly appreciated the Government of Viet Nam's approval of Japan-Viet Nam Agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Vietnamese side expressed its hope for the early conclusion of this Agreement, after the completion of necessary internal procedures in Japan. The two sides recalled the decision by the Government of Viet Nam to choose Japan as the cooperation partner for building two reactors at the second nuclear power plant site in Ninh Thuan Province, Viet Nam. The two sides welcomed
the progress made since the last Summit Meeting in October 2010 and the document to confirm such progress between the two Governments regarding cooperation on the project.
Alex Calvo is a professor of international relations and law based at European University in Barcelona.
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